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I.WARSAW CONVENTION1 
A. Girard v. American Airlines, Inc. et al. 2 
The Court found that it was undisputed that plaintiffs mJury 
occurred in the course of embarkment, but held that it was an issue of 
fact as to whether plaintiffs fall and subsequent injury constituted an 
"accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. Plaintiff 
sustained injuries when she fell as she was exiting a bus with an 
allegedly defective step. The bus was shuttling her and other 
passengers from the arrival terminal at the San Juan Airport to the 
American Airlines terminal from which plaintiffs connecting flight 
would depart. The Court stated that "the Warsaw Convention 
contemplates a form of strict liability for injuries sustained during 
international air travel and makes no provision for actual or constructive 
notice as a prerequisite for liability."3 Specifically, Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention applies "if the accident which caused the damage 
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations 
of embarking or disembarking. "4 
The Court discussed the Supreme Court's decision in Air France v. 
Saks, 5 in which the Supreme Court examined the meaning of "accident" 
for purposes of the Warsaw Convention. The Saks Court determined 
that "liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if 
a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or 
happening that is external to the passenger."6 Following the Supreme 
Court's direction, the Second Circuit finds "any unusual or unexpected 
event [to be] covered [by Chapter 17 of the Warsaw Convention] as 
long as it is external to the plaintiff."7 The Court found that plaintiff 
had satisfied causation as to defendant airlines because her injuries were 
traceable causally to the operations of the defendant airlines, finding 
that they had constructive control over the shuttle bus transporting their 
passengers from terminal to terminal. According to the Court, Plaintiff 
also had satisfied causation with respect to the defendant who actually 
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 127 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934), reprinted in 
note following 49 U.S.C. §40105. 
2. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
3. Id. at 6. 
4. Id. at 7 (quoting 49 U.S.C. §40105). 
5. 470 U.S. 392, 84 L. Ed. 2d 289, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985). 
6. Id. at 9 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7. Id. at 10. 
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owned or operated the shuttle bus in question, although the Court noted 
that a factual dispute still existed as to the actual ownership and control 
of the shuttle bus. The Court then found that the incident in question 
was an unusual or unexpected external event because "it is not usual or 
expected that the stairs of a terminal bus would abruptly give way, nor 
would an injury incurred by such a defect be within the normal 
operation of an aircraft or airline."8 As such, plaintiffs injury was 
covered by the Warsaw Convention. Nevertheless, the Court found that 
whether plaintiffs injury was caused by an "accident" was an issue for 
a jury to decide.9 A finding of fact by a jury that the step was defective 
would impose liability under the Warsaw Convention, according to the 
Court. 10 
B. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance v. American Airlines, Inc. et al. 11 
The Court held that the United States adheres to the Hague 
Protocol 12 rather than the original Warsaw Convention. This litigation 
involves the non-delivery of cargo that was scheduled to be shipped 
from Brussels, Belgium to Tulsa, Oklahoma. 13 Plaintiffs, in a motion 
for partial summary judgment, argued that the original Warsaw 
Convention applied to the shipment at issue and requested that the Court 
dismiss defendants' "eighth partial affirmative defense that its liability 
is limited by the terms of the air waybill and the Hague Protocol."14 
Defendants opposed the motion to dismiss their eighth partial 
affirmative defense and claimed that the original Warsaw Convention 
does not apply because the United States adheres to the Hague Protocol. 
Article 22 of the original Warsaw Convention would limit defendants' 
liability to $20 per kilogram of goods unless defendants failed to set 
forth the "agreed stopping places" (among other things) for the 
shipment in the air waybill as required by Article 8 of the original 
Warsaw Convention. The Hague Protocol removed the "agreed 
stopping places" requirement, among other changes to the original 
terms. 
The Court agreed with defendants that "when the United States 
8. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506, at 29-30. 
9. Id. at 31. 
10. Id. 
11. 277 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
12. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 
U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter The Hague Protocol]. 
13. Id. at 265 . 
14. Id. at 266. 
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ratified the Montreal Protocol No. 4, 15 which amended the Warsaw 
Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol, the United States 
acceded to the Hague Protocol" (italics added). 16 The Court noted that 
the United States expressly consented to adhere to the Hague Protocol 
when it ratified Montreal Protocol No. 4 because Article XVII (2) of the 
Montreal Protocol No. 4 states that: "Ratification of this Protocol by 
any State which is not a party to the Warsaw Convention as amended by 
the Hague, 1955, shall have the effect of accession to the Warsaw 
Convention as amended by the Hague, 1955, and by the Protocol No. 4 
of Montreal, 197 5" (italics added). 17 It also stated that President 
Clinton's Letter of Submittal to the Senate of the Montreal Convention 
on June 23, 2000 made it clear that with the Montreal Protocol No. 4 
"the United States also became bound by the provisions of the Hague 
Protocol. ... "18 In addressing plaintiffs' claims that the United States is 
not bound by the Hague Protocol, the Court stated that "while 
ratification of the Hague Protocol would resolve any remaining doubt 
that the United States intends to be bound by the treaty, actual 
ratification of the Hague Protocol is not necessary for the United States 
to be bound by its terms ... it is sufficient that the United States ratified 
Montreal Protocol No. 4."19 
II. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 
A. Flores, et al. v. Southern Peru Copper Corp. 20 
In Flores, et al. v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., the Second Circuit 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court dismissing plaintiffs' 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act.21 Flores and other plaintiffs, all residents of Ilo, 
Peru, brought personal injury claims against defendant Southern Peru 
Copper Corporation (SPCC), a United States company, under the Alien 
15. Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, 
amended by Protocol Done at Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9148, 
reprinted in Lawrence B. Goldhirsch, The Warsaw Convention Annotated: A Legal 
Handbook 401 (2000) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 4]. 
16. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506, at 6-7. 
17. U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506, at 7-8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18. Id. at 8. 
19. Id. at 10-11. 
20. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003). 
21. Id. at 172; see 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
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Tort Claims Act (ATCA).22 The ATCA provides that "the district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for 
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States. "23 Plaintiffs claimed that they (or their decedents) 
were suffering (or had suffered) from severe lung disease caused by 
pollution from SPCC's operations in Ilo, Peru.24 Plaintiffs argued that 
SPCC violated the law of nations (synonymous with customary 
international law in the context of the ATCA) by infringing upon their 
"right to life," "right to health," and right to "sustainable 
development. "25 The district court concluded that "plaintiffs had failed 
to state a claim under the A TCA because they had not pleaded a 
violation of any cognizable principle of customary international law."26 
In upholding the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' 
complaint, the Second Circuit discussed the decision in Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala,27 as the first case in which a federal appellate court 
recognized the ATCA as a viable basis for relief.28 The Filartiga Court 
determined that it had jurisdiction under the ATCA to adjudicate the 
claim of two Paraguayan citizens alleging that a former Paraguayan 
police inspector-general had violated the customary international law 
prohibition against official torture when he tortured and killed a 
member of their family in Paraguay. 29 Thus, "the Filartiga Court not 
only held that the ATCA provides a jurisdictional basis for suit, but also 
recognized the existence of a private right of action for aliens only 
seeking to remedy violations of customary international law or of a 
treaty of the United States. "30 The Filartiga Court then determined that 
the ATCA permitted private causes of action for recently-identified 
violations of customary international law, as opposed to only providing 
causes of action for violations of customary international law as 
customary international law was defined in 1789 when the A TCA 
became law.31 The Second Circuit also pointed to Kadic v. Karadzic32 
which made it clear that the A TCA allowed claims to be brought against 
22. Flores, 343 F.3d, at 143. 
23. Id. at 143 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24. Flores, 343 F.3d, at 143. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 145. 
27. Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
28. Flores, 343 F.3d, at 149. 
29. Id. at 149. 
30. Id. at 149-50. 
31. Id. at 151. 
32. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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private actors (as compared to the State official at issue in Filartiga).33 
The Kadic Court stated "that certain activities are of 'universal concern' 
and therefore constitute violations of customary international law not 
only when they are committed by state actors, but also when they are 
committed by private individuals. "34 The Second Circuit then noted 
that there was a split among circuits as to whether the decision in 
Filartiga, allowing private causes of action for recently-identified 
customary international law, was correct. The Second Circuit 
concluded that 
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has definitively 
resolved the complex and controversial questions regarding 
the meaning and scope of the ATCA. Whatever the differing 
perspectives among judges and scholars-differences that 
ultimately can only be resolved by Congress or the Supreme 
Court-Filartiga remains the law of this Circuit, and we 
analyze the [P]laintiffs' claims under the framework set forth 
in that case and its progeny.35 
The Second Circuit stated that "customary international law is 
composed only of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede 
to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern. "36 In order to 
determine whether something is customary international law, "courts 
must look at concrete evidence of customs and practices of states."37 
The Second Circuit stated that 
Article 3 8 [of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice] embodies the understanding of States as to what 
sources offer competent proof of the content of customary 
international law. It establishes that the proper primary 
evidence consists only of those 'conventions' (that is, 
treaties) that set forth 'rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states,' 'international custom' insofar as it 
provides 'evidence of a general practice accepted as law,' 
and 'the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations,' ... It also establishes that acceptable secondary (or 
33. Flores, 343 F.3d, at 150. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 153. 
36. Flores, 343 F .3d, at 154. 
37. Id. at 156. 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2005], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/5
2005] 2004-2005 Survey 
'subsidiary') sources summarizing customary international 
law include 'judicial decisions,' and the works of 'the most 
highly qualified publicists,' as that term would have been 
understood at the time of the Statute's drafting.38 
295 
The Second Circuit noted that "where the customs and practices of 
States demonstrate that they do not universally follow a particular 
practice out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern, that 
practice cannot give rise to a rule of customary international law. "39 
As an initial matter, the Second Circuit rejected Plaintiffs' proposal 
that a cognizable claim under the A TCA existed if the action at issue 
was "shockingly egregious" under Zapata v. Quinn.40 In Zapata, the 
court rejected the claim under the ATCA by an alien winner of the New 
York State Lottery that she was deprived of property without due 
process of law when her lottery proceedings were awarded to her in an 
annuity rather than in a lump sum.41 The Zapata Court stated, 
"jurisdiction is lacking under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the 'alien tort' statute), 
which applies only to shockingly egregious violations of universally 
recognized principles of international law .... ''42 The Second Circuit 
clarified that Zapata stood for the proposition that "[t]he phrase 
'shockingly egregious' is used descriptively, not prescriptively, merely 
to indicate that 'because universal acceptance is a prerequisite to a rule 
becoming binding as customary international law, only rules prohibiting 
acts that are 'shockingly egregious' are likely to attain that status.''43 
The Second Circuit concluded that "[ n ]o matter how shocking or 
egregious an action, it does not provide the basis for a claim under the 
ATCA unless it violates customary international law. ''44 
The Second Circuit then determined that plaintiffs did not allege a 
violation of customary international law.45 It concluded that the 
assertions of "right to life" and "right to health" are not "clear and 
unambiguous" rules of customary international law.46 With respect to 
the claim that customary international law prohibits intra-national 
38. Flores, 343 F.3d, at 157 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
39. Id. at 158. 
40. Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1983). 
41. Flores, 343 F.3d, at 159. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 160. 
46. Flores, 343 F.3d, at 160. 
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pollution, the Second Circuit held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 
that there was such a customary international law norm. The Second 
Circuit reviewed the following evidence submitted by plaintiffs and 
found them all insufficient to support a finding of customary 
international law on this issue: (1) treaties, conventions and covenants; 
(2) non-binding declarations of the United Nations General Assembly; 
(3) non-binding multinational declarations of principle; (4) 
multinational tribunals' decisions; and ( 5) affidavits of international 
scholars. 
III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT 
A. Les/ye Knox et al. v. The Palestinian Liberation Organization et al. 47 
The Court denied defendants' claim that Palestine, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, or the Palestinian Authority were entitled to 
immunity from suit in the United States. In Knox, plaintiffs, 
representative heirs and survivors of the decedent, brought a claim 
under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA), 18 U.S.C.S. § 2331 et seq., 
against a shooter, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 
Palestinian Authority (PA), the chairman of the PLO and leader of the 
PA and other defendants. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants were 
responsible for decedent's death when decedent died as a result of a 
shooting at a bat mitzvah in Israel. Defendants claimed immunity under 
the provision of the AT A that bars an action against "a foreign state, an 
agency of a foreign state, or an officer or employee of a foreign state or 
an agency thereof acting within his or her official capacity or under 
color of legal authority," 18 U.S.C. § 2337, and under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.S. § 1602 et seq. The 
Court considered both claims to be identical because the term "foreign 
state" has the same meaning under the ATA and the FSIA.48 The Court 
then rejected those claims, finding that Palestine was not recognized 
politically in the United States such that it should be accorded the 
privileges and immunities of sovereign States in the United States. In 
its decision, the Court determined that Palestine was not a state under 
international law as State is defined by the Restatement (Third)' s 
definition. The Restatement (Third), which has been adopted by the 
Second Circuit, defines a State as "an entity that has [ 1] a defined 
territory and [2] a permanent population, [3] under the control of its 
47. Knox v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
48. Id. at 430. 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2005], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/5
2005] 2004-2005 Survey 297 
own government, and that [ 4] engages in, or has the capacity to engage 
in, formal relations with other such entities. ''49 With respect to whether 
the PA has control over its territory and population within the meaning 
the Restatement, the Court found that it did not because of the limited 
governmental power of the PA. This limited governmental power 
detracted from the claim that the Palestinian territory was an 
independent State. The Court found that the PA explicitly did not have 
the authority to conduct foreign relations under Article IX of the Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 50 
The Court then found that even if there did exist a sovereign 
Palestinian State under international law, such status would not 
automaticallli make defendants immune from the Court's subject matter 
jurisdiction. 1 Specifically, the Court noted that the United States has 
not recognized or otherwise treated Palestine as a sovereign State. The 
Court determined that although both the AT A and the FSIA excluded 
foreign States from the application of those statutes, nothing in either 
statute supported the position that traditional rules of comity would not 
apply. The Court added that it is the executive branch that recognizes a 
State as sovereign, not Congress or the Court. Since the executive 
branch is putatively aware of the claim of sovereign immunity in this 
case as well as several other cases, and has not expressed any position 
that Palestine is a State for purposes of foreign sovereign immunity, the 
Court declined "to find sovereign immunity where none may exist."52 
The Court expressed its concern that if it were to find Palestine entitled 
to foreign sovereign immunity, even though the United States had not 
recognized Palestine as a State, that "may be deemed tantamount to an 
incongruous act of 'judicial recognition' of a government not 
recognized by the United States."53 Therefore, the Court declined to 
take such action. 
Finally, the Court rejected Defendants' arguments that the Court 
was being asked to decide non-justiciable claims. The Court noted that 
the intent of the AT A was to allow United States nationals justice for 
the atrocities that they may have suffered through acts of terrorism. 54 
49. Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d, at 434 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW§ 201 (1987)). 
50. Id. at 438. 
51. Id. at 438-39. 
52. Id. at 446. 
53. Id. at 448. 
54. Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d, at 448. 
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B. Reers et al. v. Deutsche Bahn AG et al. 55 
The Court granted Defendant Deutsche Bahn AG and its 
subsidiaries' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, and Defendants Accor SA and Companie 
Inter-Nationale des Wagons-Lits' motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens. Plaintiffs sued the nationally owned rail operator of 
Germany, Deutsche Bahn AG, its subsidiaries Deutsche Bahn AutoZug 
AG ("AutoZug") and Deutsche Bahn Reise & Touristik AG ("R&T"), 
the Republic of France Corporations Accor SA, Companie Inter-
N ationale des Wagons-Lits and others, in a wrongful death and survival 
action stemming from the deaths of five of their family members due to 
a fire aboard the train in which they were riding in France. The train 
was en route to Germany. The railcar to which the decedents were 
assigned was owned by AutoZug, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn. 
The Court agreed with Deutsche Bahn that it had no subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claims against Deutsche Bahn under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1603-10.56 The Court 
found that Deutsche Bahn, an instrumentality of the Republic of 
Germany within the meaning of the FSIA, was not subject to the two 
statutory exceptions to immunity claimed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had 
claimed that Deustche Bahn had waived its immunity pursuant to 
§1605(a)(l) or in the alternative, was not immune from the Court's 
jurisdiction because the action was based "upon an act outside the 
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity 
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act cause[ d] a direct effect in the 
United States .... "57 In support of their claim that Deutsche Bahn had 
waived its immunity, plaintiffs pointed to the Convention Concerning 
International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) to which Germany was a 
signatory, and which Deutsche Bahn conceded provided that each 
signatory "has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to damage 
claims arising from its railway transportation activities in other 
signatory countries ... "58 The Court noted that under the treaty the 
signatories agreed "that personal injury actions arising from railway 
accidents can be filed only in the country in which the injury 
occurred."59 The United States is not a signatory to the COTIF. The 
55. Reers v. Deutsche Bahn AG, 320 F. Supp. 2d 140, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
56. Id. at 150. 
57. Id. at 147. 
58. Id. (citing Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail (May 9, 1980), 
app. A, art. 52, § 1 ). 
59. Id. 
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Court rejected Plaintiffs' claim that the waiver contained in the treaty 
was "an implied waiver of immunity from suit in the United States 
within the meaning of the FSIA" as an overly broad reading of the 
treaty.60 The Court noted that "the FSIA's implied waiver provision 
should be construed narrowly" and stated that "[P]laintiffs provide no 
justification for finding that through such a limited waiver [as that 
contained in the COTIF], Germany and its instrumentalities have 
impliedly waived sovereign immunity for lawsuits arising in non-
signatory jurisdictions and in countries other than the country in which 
the injury giving rise to the suits occurred."61 
The Court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that the deaths resulted 
from Deutsche Bahn's commercial activity outside of the United States 
which caused a direct effect in the United States within the meaning of 
the FSIA. All parties agreed that the provision of rail transportation in 
Europe constituted a commercial activity.62 However, the Court 
determined that the fire causing the deaths at issue was a direct effect to 
those who died in France, and did not constitute an exception to 
sovereign immunity based on case law precedent discussed by the Court 
in its opinion. 63 
The Court then considered whether it had personal jurisdiction 
over AutoZug and R&T. Plaintiffs were unable to allege direct contacts 
between AutoZug and New York and only one contact between R&T 
and New York, which the Court rejected as insufficient because the 
contact did not show R&T "conducted a continuous course of business 
in New York or executed ... contracts [with U.S. airlines which have 
operations in New York to develop 'rail and fly' packages for U.S. 
customers] in New York. "64 The Court then considered Plaintiffs' 
argument that AutoZug and R&T were "mere departments" of Deutsche 
Bahn, such that Deutsche Bahn's direct contacts with New York would 
be sufficient to result in personal jurisdiction. The Court pointed to the 
flaw in plaintiffs' logic in that if AutoZug and R&T were mere 
departments of Deutsche Bahn, they would then be entitled to Deutsche 
Bahn' s sovereign immunity because as mere departments of Deutsche 
Bahn, they "are not separate corporate entities at all, but rather alter 
egos of an immune entity."65 The Court then rejected plaintiffs' claim 
60. Reers, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 147-48. 
61. Id. at 148. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 149. 
64. Id. 
65. Reers, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 149. 
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that it had jurisdiction over these two entities because they were doing 
business through an agent in New York, and concluded that plaintiffs 
had not made a prima facie showing of the Court's personal jurisdiction 
over AutoZug and R&T. 
The Court then considered, but did not fully decide, whether it had 
jurisdiction over the Republic of France Corporations of Accor SA and 
Companie Intem-Nationale des Wagons-Lits because it granted their 
motion to dismiss based on the doctrine forum non conveniens. The 
Court determined that France was an adequate alternative forum 
because defendants were amenable to process there (under the COTIF) 
and French law permits litigation of the subject matter of the suit.66 The 
Court then considered the gublic and private interest factors set forth in 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. According to the Court, the public interest 
factors include "(l) the administrative difficulties arising from 
congested courts; (2) the imposition of jury duty on members of a 
community unconnected to the litigation; (3) a forum's interest in 
adjudicating local controversies; and ( 4) the potential difficulties arising 
from the application of foreign law."68 While the Court found that the 
first and fourth factors added little weight to its analysis because the 
recent filling of judicial vacancies in New York meant less congestion 
in the courts and no parties had indicated any issues with applying 
French law, it determined that the second and third factors weighed 
heavily in favor of litigation in France as the most appropriate forum. 
This was due to France's strong interest in the lawsuit in terms of its 
interest in having safe trains and partners that properly maintain the 
trains and educate their employees, as well as the significant burden that 
would be imposed on New York jurors.69 In considering the Gilbert 
private interest factors including "the relative ease of access to sources 
of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, 
and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; possibility of 
view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all 
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive,"70 and the financial hardship faced by each party in 
litigating in a distant forum, the Court found that the action should be 
dismissed in favor of litigation in France. 
66. Reers, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 158. 
67. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947) 
68. Id. at 159 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-509). 
69. Reers, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 160. 
70. Id. (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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C. Human Rights in China v. Bank of China71 
The Court granted Defendant Bank of China's motion to dismiss 
Plaintiff Human Rights in China's claim that the Bank of China 
allegedly colluded with Chinese authorities to allow the Chinese 
authorities to confiscate certain funds because the Court did not have 
jurisdiction over the claim under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 
Human Rights in China (HRIC) alleged that the Bank of China (BOC) 
(1) refused to cancel HRIC's wire transfer of $20,000 and return the 
funds; (2) made fraudulent statements to HRIC's bank regarding the 
status of the transferred funds; and (3) colluded with the Beijing Police 
which resulted in the Police confiscating the transferred funds. 72 On 
June 14, 1999, HRIC requested that $20,000 from its New York account 
be transferred to the BOC's Beijing branch's bank account of "Jane 
Lee" (this was a fictitious name used by the Court to conceal the 
identity of the person at issue), a Chinese citizen.73 
The purpose of the funds was apparently to provide cash to 
families of Chinese citizens killed in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 
1989. 74 The HRIC usually concealed its identity out of concern that the 
Chinese government's reaction would be hostile by identifying itself as 
HRIC instead of "Human Rights in China."75 The bank transfer at 
issue, however, was requested by a recently hired employee who 
identified the sender as Human Rights in China instead of HRIC.76 
Upon learning of the error, HRIC became concerned about Jane Lee's 
safety and sought to cancel the transaction. 77 A series of 
communications between HRIC's New York bank and the BOC 
occurred between June 15, 1999 and February 3, 2000 (in part through 
Society for Worldwide Inter-bank Telecommunications' (SWIFT) 
messages), but ultimately the funds were not returned to HRIC's New 
York bank. 78 
The BOC claimed that it had already credited the funds to Jane 
Lee's account prior to receiving the communication from HRIC's New 
71. Human Rights in China v. Bank of China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 1 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2003). 
72. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 2. 
73. Id. at 5-6. 
74. Id. at 5. 
75. Id. at 6. 
76. Id. at 7-11. 
77. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 7. 
78. Id. at 8. 
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York bank to cancel the transfer.79 On approximately June 27, 1999, 
Jane Lee was detained by the Beijing Police and questioned about the 
funds that she claimed she had received no notice from the bank of their 
being deposited. 80 The Beijing Police then allegedly required her to 
withdraw the funds and immediately confiscated the funds from her.81 
The parties did not dispute that under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) the BOC was an ·"instrumentality" of the 
Chinese government and therefore a "foreign State" under the FSIA.82 
In order for the Court to have jurisdiction over the BOC, one of the 
exceptions to the immunities foreign States and instrumentalities 
normally enjoy from suit in the United States must apply.83 The Court 
determined that only the "commercial activity" exception of the FSIA 
could possibly apply.84 That exception states that immunity is not 
available in any case 
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign State; or upon 
an act performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon 
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and 
that act causes a direct effect in the United States.85 
In order for the first or second commercial activity exception to 
apply, the "claims being litigated must be 'based upon' the activities 
within the United States-i.e., the United States commercial activities 
must comprise 'those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a 
plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case. "'86 The Court added that 
"the Second Circuit imposes a requirement in lawsuits brought under 
the first clause of the commercial activity exception that there be a 
significant nexus between the United States commercial activities and 
the plaintiffs cause of action."87 Although the BOC engages in a 
79. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 8. 
80. Id. at 9. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 12-13. 
83. Id. at 13. 
84. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 13. 
85. Id. at 13-14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2)). 
86. Id. at 15 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993)(intemal 
quotation marks omitted). 
87. Id. at 15. 
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significant amount of commercial activity in the United States, the 
Court found that those generalized banking activities are insufficient to 
satisfy either the first or second clauses of the commercial activity 
exception because the SWIFT messages sent from the BOC to HRIC's 
New York bank "were not acts carried on or performed 'in the United 
States' ... [t]hey were acts performed in China, and that cannot be 
altered by the fact that they were sent to a party within the United 
States. "88 
The Court then examined whether the third clause of the 
commercial activity exception applied. It determined that it had 
insufficient information regarding whether there had been a "direct 
effect in the United States" within the meaning of the FSIA. 89 The 
Court discussed Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,90 which it 
characterized as "[t]he leading case on the direct effect requirement."91 
According to Weltover, "an effect is 'direct' under Section 1605(a)(2) 
'if it follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's 
activity. "'92 
The Court addressed HRIC's claim that the BOC failed to rescind 
the wire transfer and return the funds separately from the allegation that 
the BOC colluded with Beijing Police to confiscate the money. With 
respect to the failure to rescind the wire transfer, the Court stated that 
"if HRIC could establish that, at the time the [BOC] learned of [HRIC's 
bank's] request to reverse the wire transfer, it had not deposited the 
money in Jane Lee's account and could have reversed the transaction, 
then it would follow that the Bank's decision not to do so had a direct 
effect on HRIC."93 Although the BOC had provided some evidence that 
the funds had already been deposited into Jane Lee's account before 
HRIC sought to cancel the transaction and claimed that banking 
regulations would not require the rescission of a wire transfer once 
funds were deposited, the Court found that additional factual 
information was required on this issue. Therefore, the Court denied 
BOC' s motion to dismiss these claims against it, but noted that BOC 
could renew this argument after discovery was conducted on this 
issue.94 
88. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 16. 
89. See id. at 21. 
90. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
91. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 18. 
92. Id. (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618). 
93. Id. at 19. 
94. Id. at 20. 
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With respect to the claim that BOC colluded with Beijing Police so 
that Police could confiscate the funds, the Court held that the FSIA 
prevented it from exercising jurisdiction over that claim because the 
alleged acts did not occur in the United States, but rather occurred in 
China, and did not have a direct effect in the United States.95 With 
regard to this issue, the Court also noted that the actions of the Beijing 
Police were intervening events and that if the BOC communicated with 
the Beijing Police on this issue, its actions were political rather than 
commercial. 96 
IV. LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN DEFENDANTS 
A. In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria97 
Court granted motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction of 
Defendant Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG (GBK). Plaintiffs, the parents, 
spouses and grandparents of eight Americans who died in a November 
2000 ski train fire in Kaprun, Austria, claimed that the Court had 
personal jurisdiction over GBK based on GBK's website advertising, 
promotional activities and spoliation of evidence. 98 The Court noted 
that in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction 
under the forum State's laws and that the exercise of such jurisdiction 
comports with due process.99 The Court determined New York was the 
forum State and therefore examined whether it had jurisdiction under 
Sections 301 and 302(a) of New York Civil Procedure. It found that it 
did not have general jurisdiction under Section 301 because GBK's 
alleged marketing activities were not sufficient to constitute "doing 
business" in New York. 100 
The Court stated that GBK's alleged advertising abroad, even if it 
constituted contacts with the United States, was insufficient to allow the 
exercise of jurisdiction by New York courts over GBK. The Court also 
found that allegations that GBK offered discount promotions to military 
bases and businesses in New York was not sufficient to constitute 
"doing business" in New York. Finally, the Court held that "a 
95. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 21-22. 
96. Id. at 22-23. 
97. In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Aus., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22139, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 9, 2003). 
98. Id. at 11. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 15. 
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defendant's website alone cannot form the basis for general jurisdiction 
in New York because 'the fact that a foreign corporation has a website 
accessible in New York is insufficient to confer jurisdiction under 
CPLR § 301. "'101 
The Court then examined whether jurisdiction was proper under 
Section 302(a)(l), New York's long-arm statute which allows a court to 
exercise jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary if "the nondomiciliary 
transacts business within the state, [and] the claim against the 
nondomiciliary arises out of that business activity."102 The Court then 
examined whether GBK's website activity and other marketing 
activities allowed the exercise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. 
It concluded that they did not. The Court stated that while "interactive" 
websites generally support a finding of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs 
had failed to allege a substantial relationship between the website and 
their claims. That is, there was no allegation that the website was 
visited by the victims of the ski train fire or that they had used the 
website to make their November 2000 reservations. 
With respect to GBK's other marketing activities, such as 
marketing to English-speaking people and discounts for U.S. military 
personnel, the Court found that they were also insufficient to confer 
long-arm jurisdiction under 302(a)(l) because Plaintiffs did not allege 
that these activities "rose to the level of GBK's 'transacting business' in 
New York either in terms of frequency or revenue and a connection 
between the victims of the ski train fire and the discounts."103 Finally, 
the Court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that GBK's European marketing 
activities were sufficient for the basis of personal jurisdiction because 
contacts with U.S. military bases abroad, even assuming arguendo that 
they constituted contacts with U.S. territory were nevertheless not 
contacts with New York. 
The Court then examined whether personal jurisdiction existed 
under Section 302(a)(3) which allows personal jurisdiction to 
be asserted over a non-domiciliary if the non-domiciliary 
'commits a tortuous act without the state' injuring a person 
within New York, and either (i) 'regularly does or solicits· 
business, or engages in any other persistent course of 
conduct,' or (ii) derives substantial revenue from interstate 
101. In re Ski Train Fire, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22139, at 15. 
102. Id. at 16. 
103. Id. at 21-22. 
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commerce and expects or reasonably should expect the 
tortuous act to have consequences in the state. 104 
The Court stated that exercise of jurisdiction under this provision 
required the court to apply a "situs-of-injury test" to determine whether 
the original event which caused the injury was in New York. According 
to the Court, the original event from which the case arises was GBK's 
tortuous acts relating to the ski train fire in Kaprun, Austria, not injury 
to a person within New York.105 Finally, the Court rejected Plaintiffs' 
argument that because the Court ordered GBK to preserve evidence and 
allegedly destroyed that evidence (that is, GBK's alleged spoliation of 
evidence), the Court now had jurisdiction over GBK. The Court noted 
that its "orders to preserve evidence explicitly preserved GBK's right to 
challenge the underlying action on the basis of personal jurisdiction." 106 
V. EXTRADITION 
A. In re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic 107 
In the matter of the Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, the 
Court denied the application of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, a/k/a/ 
"Muhamed Sacirbey" (Sacirbey), a naturalized U.S. citizen, to be 
released on bail pending a hearing on the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's (BiH) formal request for his extradition. BiH requested 
Sacirbey's extradition pursuant to its Mutual Extradition Treaty with the 
United States ("Treaty") because "Sacirbey has been charged in BiH 
with the crime of abuse of position or powers in violation of Article 
358, Paragraph 3, of the BiH Criminal Code."108 These charges 
stemmed from allegations that Sacirbey had withdrawn funds from the 
BiH's Permanent Mission to the United Nations and General Consulate 
and from an account belonging to the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Investment Fund Ministry and transferred them into his 
private bank accounts. 109 Subsequently, Sacirbey was arrested pursuant 
to a Complaint for Arrest with a View Toward Extradition, and 
detained. 
Sacirbey applied for bail pending his extradition hearing. As an 
104. In re Ski Train Fire, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22139, at 26. 
105. Id. at 27. 
106. Id. at 29. 
107. In re Extradition ofMuhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F. Supp. 2d 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
I 08. Id. at 82. 
109. Id. 
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initial matter, the Court noted that "bail applications in extradition cases 
are typically denied in the absence of 'special circumstances' [because] 
if the accused were to be released on bond and thereafter absconded, the 
mere surrender of a quantity of cash or other property 'would hardly 
meet the international demand' and could cause the United States 
government 'serious embarrassment.'"110 The Court then considered 
Sacirbey' s argument that his request for bail should be granted because 
he does not need to show "special circumstances" for three reasons: (1) 
the BiH has not formally charged him with any crime; (2) he is a U.S. 
citizen; and (3) the criminal acts alleged by BiH occurred in the United 
States.111 The Court rejected all three claims. 
With respect to the claim that he has not been formally charged in 
BiH, the Court cited to Borodin v. Ashcroft, 112 in which the court stated 
that "the 'charge' requirement is satisfied br a requesting nation's intent 
to prosecute as evidenced by he record. " 11 The Court then found that 
there was sufficient information in the BiH's request for extradition to 
suggest an intent to prosecute Sacirbey, thereby satisfying the charge 
requirement. The Court also rejected Sacirbey's position that because 
he was a U.S. citizen and the Treaty did not compel the extradition of 
American citizens, there was no "overriding national interest" regarding 
his extradition and his constitutional individual liberty interests should 
therefore prevail in this matter. 114 The Court noted that the Secretary of 
State has the discretion to extradite a U.S. citizen. As such, "[t]he fact 
that the United States is not compelled to extradite Sacirbey therefore 
does not constitute a basis for ignoring the presumption that an accused 
whose extradition is sought will not be granted bail in the absence of 
'special circumstances. "'115 Indeed, the Court stated that "there 
consequently is a presumption against bail for someone whose 
extradition has been formally sought."116 
The Court then rejected Sacirbey's claims that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction to order his extradition because the alleged crimes were 
committed in the United States rather than in BiH and he was not a 
"fugitive" within the meaning of the Treaty. The Treaty provides for 
the extradition of persons "who, having been charged with or convicted 
110. Jn re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F.Supp.2d, at 83. 
111. Id. 
112. Borodin v. Ashcroft, 136 F. Supp. 2d 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
113. In re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F.Supp.2d, at 84 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 85. 
116. Id. at 83. 
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of any of the crimes and offenses specified in the following article, 
committed within the jurisdiction of one of the high contracting parties, 
shall seek asylum or be found within the territories of the other .... "117 
The Court stated that the use of the phrase "committed within the 
jurisdiction" must be construed in a manner to support BiH' s request, 
and therefore meant subject to the legal authority of BiH to hear and 
decide a case as proposed by the U.S. government rather than 
Sacirbey's claim that it meant the crime was committed in BiH.118 
Finally, with respect to Sacirbey's "fugitive" claim, the Court noted that 
the Treaty applied to the "fugitive or person so charged" and therefore 
jurisdiction was not dependent on Sacirbey being a "fugitive."119 The 
Court then noted that, in any event, "fugitive" in American extradition 
treaties is "usually construed to regard fugitive as one who is charged 
with having committed a crime punishable under the laws of the 
demanding State, but who is not to be found in that territory after 
allegedly committing the crime."120 
Having thus disposed of Sacirbey's arguments that its request for 
bail should be granted because he was not required to show "special 
circumstances," the Court then considered and rejected Sacirbey's 
arguments that under the "special circumstances" standard the Court 
should grant bail. The Court found that Sacirbey's alleged "special 
circumstances" of (1) eligibility for bail in BiH; (2) BiH's political 
situation; (3) likelihood of prevailing at the extradition hearing; and ( 4) 
alleged lack of flight risk, did not constitute "special circumstances" 
such that he should be released from custody pending the extradition 
hearing. With respect to being eligible for bail in BiH, the Court stated 
that "there is no basis for Sacirbey's suggestion that the mere possibility 
of bail in the requesting nation constitutes a special circumstance."121 
The Court then rejected Sacirbey's claim that the political situation in 
BiH was fractious and he would be recognized, and stated, "There does 
not appear to be any Second Circuit case law suggesting that persons 
charged with alleged political offenses are entitled to special 
consideration by being granted bail pending an extradition hearing," and 
that in any event, there was no information on the record that Sacirbey 
117. Jn re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F.Supp.2d, at 85 (quoted in 
Treaty, Art. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 86 (quoting United States v. Marasco, 275 F. Supp. 492, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121. Id. at 87. 
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was not an "ordinary potential extraditee. "122 
With respect to Sacirbey's likelihood of success on the merits 
argument, the Court rejected, as meritless, Sacirbey's argument that the 
extradition request would fail because the Treaty covered persons who 
committed crimes in BiH (and he did not). The Court also found that 
Sacirbey's second likelihood of success on the merits claim, that the 
evidence submitted in support of the extradition request was insufficient 
on its face, would be unsupported and in any event would be addressed 
at the extradition hearing. 123 The Court then found that even if Sacirbey 
was not a flight risk, this was not a "special circumstance." Finally, the 
Court considered whether the factors combined rose to the level of a 
"special circumstance," and determined that Sacirbey's "special 
circumstances" showing was insufficient to justify bail. 124 
122. In re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F.Supp.2d, at 88. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
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